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Abst rac t - -Semant ic  networks need many more links than traditional ones include if they are to 
function as adequate models of human memory. Many tasks benefit from cognltively realistic repre- 
sentations. Such cognitively realistic models of human reasoning processes require a deep understand- 
ing of the logical properties of their links. This paper argues for three basic claims. First, we must 
identify the links that are fundaanental to hunuxn cognitive processes. Second, we must understand 
how their logical properties are actually used in conunon sense reasoning. Third, even though the 
resulting properties are not nearly as neat as those of their better lumwn mathematical counterparts, 
we must investigate and use those properties if we want our systems to he representationally ade- 
quate. Tiffs paper presents analyses of three links, and in the process demonstrates a methodology 
for dealing with these issues. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Semantic networks represent information as a collection of nodes connected by labeled arcs that 
express links or relationships betwecn the nodes. The most widely rccognizcd links in traditional 
semantic networks arc is-a and part-whole. These two relations do not begin to exhaust ile links 
that appear to be fundamental to human knowledge representation, and there is no reason to 
suppose that they will suffice in machines. Consequently, semantic networks intendcd to represent 
general conceptual information require a far greater number and variety of links if they are to 
model information processing and inferencing in a cognitively realistic way. 
Familiar knowledge representation research based on semantic networks often centers on such 
issues as what arc labels to include or how to implement inheritance fficiently. Our focus here 
is somewhat different. As we illustrate below, it is easy to define alternative representations of a 
given relationship: what is represented by an arc label in one model can be expressed by a node in 
another. The resulting tradeoffs often resemble arguments about efficiency in that neither can be 
assessed convincingly outside the framework of a specific problem. The issues we focus on here, 
by contrast, cut across wide classes of problems, and in this sense, they lie at a deeper level. We 
want to identify kinds of paths any semantic network must include to achieve representational 
adequacy and cognitive validity for generalized reasoning over realistically complex domains. 
We are also concerned with strengthening the inferencing power of networks. By inference we 
mean any cognitively justifiable technique for deriving implications from explicitly represented 
information. Inferential reasoning is fundamental to tasks such as question answering and text 
understanding. In this broad sense, it includes both methods from first order logic and inferences 
based upon the existence or nonexistence of paths of certain kinds: drawing out information which 
is implicit in the structure of the graph. Including a wider range of links with stronger semantic 
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content in the associational framework of semantic nets enhances the power and flexibility of 
reasoning about the nodes those paths connect. 
The links of interest o us are conceptually basic. By this, we mean that they are fundamental 
to how people seem to organize knowledge. This orientation arises from three sources. First, it 
reflects our commitment to cognitively realistic representations because of an interest in studying 
cognition. Second, our interest in semantic network applications uch as information retrieval 
and natural anguage processing leads naturally to a preference for cognitively realistic structures 
to facilitate those tasks. Third, on more pragmatic grounds, relatively natural representation 
techniques can reduce a wide variety of problems for knowledge based systems, most particularly 
the knowledge acquisition "bottleneck." 
We make no claim that the links we recotmnend are mathematical primitives in the sense that 
they (or their closest mathematical nalogs) are not mutually definable. On the contrary: subset 
can be defined in terms of member, for example, but there is strong evidence that a close analog of 
subset and a close analog of member are both conceptually fundamental links in human memory. 
Nor are we looking for economy of axiomatization. Instead, we seek economy of representation, 
processing, and inference: a conceptual economy that permits the full richness of the connections 
within the information to emerge. 
Thus, we are interested in the paths or conceptual links needed to represent cognitive contents 
and processes adequately. We are not especially concerned with how those links are translated into 
specific collections of arcs and nodes, however, because a given relationship can be represented in 
a variety of ways. For instance, suppose we want to represent the notion that Fido is a dog. Using 
a KL-ONE approach [1], we can include nodes for Fido and for dog, with an Is-A link between 
them (see Figure la). In the SNePS paradigm [2,3], tile usual representation is a proposition 
node (node ml of Figure lb) with two arcs, a member arc to the node for Fido and a class arc to 
the node for dog. This representation "moves" the relation from a single arc to two, and adds an 
explicit representation f tile proposition "Fido is a dog"--the node m l--which previously was 
buried i,i an arc. 
An alternative, more explicit SNcPS representation (Figure l c) uses a proposition uode (m l) 
and three arcs: an ar91 arc to Fido, an arg~ arc to dog, and a )'el arc to a node labeled mem- 
ber. This representation makes explicit that Fido and dog stand iu a particular elationship 
represented by tile node member, which is itself a node in the network, and may have explicit 
information asserted about it. 
1 I a. KL-ONE representation 
n lon lber  class 
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Figure 1. Three repreaentations for "Fido is a dog." 
All three representations in Figure 1 contain a taxonomic link even though they realize that 
link in different ways. Preference for one or another of these representations depends largely on 
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what the user wants to do with it. (The obvious exception is relations whose arity is higher than 
two, for which the two SNePS representations are clearly better than the KL-ONE style.) The 
real issue, though, is what paths can be reached by tracing arcs from a given node, as opposed 
to using general methods of pattern match and unification. Hence in this paper we will use the 
term "link" to refer to a connection that may be represented by a single labeled arc, a sequence 
of such arcs, or a combination of arcs with restrictions on what nodes they pass through and 
what other arcs those nodes have coming out of them. 
Identifying conceptually basic links requires considerable research in a wide range of fields. 
Our work on semantic networks and lexical thesauri, which owes much to that of Mel'~uk [4,5], 
has identified over a hundred types of links [6-13]. As a result of this work we have constructed 
a taxonomic hierarchy of le.,6cal-semantic relations [11]. This hierarchy contains both basic and 
non-basic semantic relations as well as a large number of lexical relations. The top levels of that 
hierarchy are shown in Figure 2. 
Lexical.Semantic Relations 
S c m ~ l a n c o u s  
Rdatio,ls / ~ Relations 
Morphological attd Propositional 
Syntactic Relations Attitude Relations 
Fig'tare 2. Top levels of a hierarchy of Lexic',d-Semluttic Relation,~. 
Since the focus of this paper is on the semantic links, we exclude links like collocation that are 
primarily lexical. We also exclude conceptual links that are bound to limited, well-defined o- 
mains. For example, work with medical exicons upports the link dysfunction (which represents 
the relationship between aphasia and speech) as an important and widely used link in medicine; 
but it has little relevance for most other domains. After excluding these and similar links, though, 
there remain many conceptually basic links whose area of application is very broad. They belong 
to the "Semantic Relations" branch of the hierarchy shown in Figure 3. (For a stripped down 
version of the entire hierarchy from [11], see the Appendix.) 
But identifying an appropriate set of links is not enough. We must also understand the reason- 
ing patterns associated with them. Reasoning from conceptual links often involves restrictions, 
exceptions, and interactions with other links. These complications have received a lot of atten- 
tion in the case of taxonomic inheritance. Links used for inheritance-based reasoning must be 
transitive; therefore it is important o know which links are transitive and which are not. Other 
kinds of links have their own associated inference patterns based on their own logical properties. 
Because such links and their associated properties form the basis for much of common sense rea- 
soning and conceptual information processing, realistic representations cannot afford to ignore 
them. Reasoning by analogy is an important device in theoretical physics as well as in every day 
living. It is easy to assume that links that are used in this kind of reasoning must be symmetric, 
but we show below (see similarity) that this is not necessarily the case. It is essential to analyze 
these links in their full complexity, using evidence from every reliable source we can find. 
The three classes of links that we will describe are necessary for adequate conceptual represen- 
tation. They are queuing, similarity, and the family of relations that are loosely called part-whole. 
These three relations are represented in bold face in Figure 3. We do not claim that these links 
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Figure 3. Top levels of the Semantic Relations branch of the relation hierarchy. 
constitute a minimal set, nor do we claim to know tile full extension of any link. Given tile messi- 
ness of conceptual links, we prefer instead to evaluate what we consider to be good evidence for 
each of the links. In doing so we present an evaluation methodology along with our discussions. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
Tile three major issues involved in analyzing links from our perspective are conceptual reality, 
identity (including necessary distinctions from other links and interactions with them), and its 
logical and inferential properties. Hence for each link we provide the following information: 
• A definition with typical examples; 
• Linguistic formulae used to express the link; 
• Validation for the link from a variety of sources; 
• Specification of its logical properties; 
• Interaction with other links; and 
• Examples of how the link can be used for inferencing. 
Validation 
Sources we use for our analyses include literature from mathematics, computer science and 
information retrieval. Evidence for the psychological reality and general use of the links comes 
from research in anthropology, psychology, and child development. One such source is the Con- 
necticut Word Association Norms [14] which lists word associations for 400 nouns, verbs, and 
adjectives gathered from 150 subjects. We also consider work on linguistics, lexicography, and 
semantic relations. When we look for the kind of conceptual structures that underlie everyday 
(as opposed to formalized) thought, literary and folk definitions are one of the richest sources 
of information to which we can appeal, and by no means the least reliable. Sources include 
Webster's Seventh Collegiate Dictionary (WT); Longman's Dictionary of Contemporary English 
(LDOCE), a dictionary for advanced learners of English; and folk definitions gathered from adults 
and children. 
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Logical Properties 
Effective use of conceptual links requires an understanding of the logical properties they possess 
and how those properties affect inferencing. We examine relations in terms of the logical proper- 
ties of transitivity, symmetry, and reflexivity, defined mathematically (see Figure 4). Where links 
have familiar mathematical models, this analysis may seem trivial (indeed, it has already been 
done). But mathematical models of conceptually basic relations have typically been "cleaned 
up." Conceptual links tend to be deep, subtle, and lacking clear borders; their mathematical 
analogs, by contrast, have been made precise, explicit, and specific. This cleaning up is crucial 
for analyzing the relation in certain regards, but when we try to go back to the original motivating 
conceptual link, the mathematical nalysis may prove inapplicable. 
Prot~er{.y_.. Dcfit)itiot~ 
R is 'l'raasitivc ]/'f Vx.y,zl(R(x.y) ^ R(y.z)) ~ R(x,z)l 
R is Symmetric ]ff  Vx.yIR(x,y) _.~ R(y,x)l 
R is Reflexive ]ff  Vx R(x.x) 
Figure 4. Definitions of logical properties. 
Thus properties that are familiarly associated with mathematical links may fail unexpectedly 
in their conceptual nalogs. Because we are concerned with cognitively realistic representations of 
the conceptual links in their full messiness, we can neither eplace the links by nearer analogs nor 
borrow our analyses from the mathematical models. We are especially concerned about variance 
and failure of the properties because the conceptual links do not necessarily behave consistently. 
Inconsistency may be related to context, to other, non-mathematical kinds of properties (such as 
temporal and causal ones), or to differences in the nature of the concepts being linked. Therefore 
in our discussion we indicate when and, if possible, why the properties fail. 
There are a number of reasons why properties widely attributed to conceptual links or their 
mathematical nalogs might fail. One is that the relation simply does not have the property, 
even though it may initially appear to. For example, a relation might be almost antisymmetric 
(R(x,y) implies not R(y,z)), except that it is reflexive (so antisymmetry fails for y = x). In 
cases like this, it may be most reasonable to say that the identified property (antisymmetry) does 
not hold, but that another very similar one does. More complex situations arise when a link 
is ambiguous. For instance, there has been substantial controversy over whether the part-whole 
relation is transitive. Iris et al. [15] have argued that this controversy results from unrecognized 
ambiguity: part-whole is not a simple relation, but a family consisting of four different relations, 
some of which are transitive while others are not (see also the section on part-whole below). 
We have argued elsewhere [11-13,16] that conceptual links form a highly complex hierarchy, 
with a great deal of internal structure. From that viewpoint, the error here involves treating an 
intermediate node in the hierarchy as if it were a leaf. In addition, most studies of conceptual links 
have assumed that they constitute a set of essentially unrelated relations. There have even been 
analyses of all links in terms of a small set of orthogonal links [17,18]. The tendency toward this 
kind of analysis can easily compound the ambiguities resulting from failure to distinguish levels, 
and can confuse issues of when properties do or do not hold by failing to notice dependencies. 
Properties also fail when the "ideal" relation has the property while most actual instances do 
not. The clearest example here is in the lexical link synonymy, which holds between two terms 
provided they represent the same concept (have the same meanings). Since synonymy appeals to 
identity, one would expect it to be transitive, and it is, for true synonyms. Unfortunately, most 
real examples of synonyms have only partial overlap of meaning. Because different instances of 
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the synonym relation may involve overlap in different parts of meaning, inference chains based 
on transitivity may break down so that synonymy no longer holds between the terms at the 
endpoints. In a dictionary published by Collins, it is possible on the average to go from any 
given word through specified synonyms to its antonym, with only six intervening terms [19]. 
Property failures of this type are likely to be very common, because human classifications tend to 
be "dirty." Accurate representation must capture these failures; it is simply not useful to reject 
almost all instances of conceptual links like synonymy. 
Finally, a property may hold for a (significant, non-empty) subset of the universe and may, 
therefore, require restrictions. For instance, membership is not transitive, but membership re- 
stricted to transitive sets is transitive. (A transitive set is a set all of whose elements are also 
subsets. The most familiar transitive sets are probably the standard set theoretic representations 
of the ordinals, i.e., 0, {0}, {0, {0}}, etc.) That is, let 
w,  y) ^ aCy, - -  rt( , .-)] 
represent the claim that R is transitive, and let 
vx, y, y) ^ R(y, :) ^ y, - -  .-)] 
represent the claim that R is transitive when restricted by (I) (where (b is a well formed formula 
containing zero or more occurrences of x, y, and -', and no other unbound variables). Since 
"R(z, :)" is a legal instance of (I), clearly some cases of restricted transitivity are uninteresting. 
But if • is "Trans(y) A Trans(:)" (i.e., y and z are both transitive sets), we get the claim that 
membership is transitive for transitive sets. When (unlike the example) the restriction allows 
more instances than it blocks, it may appear that the property holds for tim entire universc, 
which may explain cases in which the unrestricted property was believed to hold. 
Link Interaction 
Our interest in interactions among links derives from our concerns about the effects those 
interactions may have upon inferencing. Research on interaction of links and link properties 
indicates that it is a fruitful source of knowledge xtension in semantic networks [20-23]. 
3. ANALYSIS 
Queuing 
Definition and linguistic expression. Queuing is a link that expresses order or sequence. Ex- 
amples of overt queuing are common (mathematical proofs, computer science programs and algo- 
rithms, cooking recipes and temporal plans, etc.). In the purest cases, these are either temporal 
or purely conceptual orderings with no physical association. 
Ordinal numbers constitute the most direct linguistic expression of queuing. English speakers 
also use queuing to express patial ordering. Connectives like "before," "after," "then," "next," 
the temporal use of "between" and verbs "precede" and "follow" are also common linguistic 
formulae for queuing. English and some other languages have examples of assimilation of spatial 
and temporal concepts, and as a result English speakers also use queuing to express spatial 
ordering. Since the extension from abstract and temporal to spatial orderings does not appear 
universally, we will limit our discussion to the more basic conceptual and temporal uses. 
Logical properties. Queuing is one of the most logically consistent of the conceptual links. It is 
typically transitive, non-reflexive and non-symmetric, and it is difficult to come up with simple, 
natural cases of violation of those properties. So long as the relata do not denote intervals, 
queuing is total for its domain, i.e., 
Vz, y, z[(queueCz, y) A Queue(x, z)) --- (Queue(y, z) v QueueCz, y))] 
Theoretical support. Queuing is found in a variety of theories. Network models in computer sci- 
ence generally express it with links named "before, .... after" and "then" [24,25]. In anthropology 
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queuing constitutes the temporal sequence component of Casagrande and Hale's [26] "contin- 
gency" rink, which covers examples like "when it rains, it lightnings." The contingency link was 
the second most frequent link found by Casagrande and Hale in their Papago folk definitions. 
Anthropologist Oswald Werner uses queuing (Q) as the basis of "verbal action plans" [18,27]. The 
plan for getting up is: (waking up) Q (reaching over) Q (turning off the alarm) Q (getting out of 
bed). In psychology Klaus Riegel [28] uses separate queuing links "preceding" and "succeeding," 
and Kintsch employs the propositional connective "then" to handle story analysis [291. 
Evidence from linguistic sources and psychological studies. Both W7 and LDOCE use the 
queuing rink to define days of the week, months, seasons of the year and ordinal numbers. For 
instance, LDOCE defines "Monday" as "the .. .  day before next Tuesday or last Tuesday." 
Queuing is also used to define queuing terms themselves. "First," for example, is defined as 
"preceding all others in order or importance," and "then" as "following next after in order." 
Markowitz and Moses [6] found queuing to be common in definitions of first and second graders. 
If, in the child's experience, the word named a process, the definition was usually a process 
description based on queuing. In the Connecticut Word Association Norms [14], the most frequent 
response to the stimulus word "one" was "two," "June" was strongly associated with the stimulus 
word "May," and "spring" was a common response for "winter." 
Interaction with other relations. Queuing is the temporal component of cause. A causal event 
occurs before the consequence. Thus "x Cause y" implies "x Queue y." Roger Schank's restau- 
rant script, which is defined as a causal sequence, provides an excellent illustration: the waiter 
brings the menu which causes the diner to order which causes the waiter to bring the food, and 
so on [30]. French [31] provides additional support from cognitive development by demonstrating 
that children develop the order component of cause later than the temporal componcnt. 
Inferencing. Using queuing in networks allows the extrapolation ofimplicit or explicit scqucnce. 
It is therefore important for story understanding and, as we mentioned above, in both the de- 
termination and comprehension f causality. It is easy to build queuing structures uch ,as days 
of the week, months of the year, or plans into a semantic network. If we know that the invasion 
occurred on Monday and the bombing occurred on Friday of that week, we can infcr that the 
bombing occurred after the invasion. This simple example can be extended to infcrencing about 
message and document sequences. Suppose our network contains Werncr's plan for getting up. 
If we are told that Mary has just awakened ("awaken" synouyn, "wake up") then we can use the 
plan to infcr that she has not gotten out of bed. 
Implicit queuing is often expressed by words like "after," "before," and "then." Given the 
instruction "Important! Before screwing on the backplane remove the packing in the slots," we 
use queuing to recognize that the order of events should be the rcverse of their order in the 
sentence. 
Similarity 
Definition and linguistic expression. Similarity is the name we give to a link that expresses a 
strong correspondence b tween two nodes or referents. It forms the basis of human categorization 
and is a component of many cognitive activities. Linguistically, it is often expressed by words 
such as "like" and "resemble," as in "A dog is like a wolf, only smaller" [26], which is why it is 
sometimes called "comparison." 
Logical properties. Similarity is the messiest of the links we discuss. Like equivalence, which it 
resembles, imilarity illustrates important differences between mathematical nd conceptual links. 
In mathematics, equivalence has a straightforward explication that can be submitted easily to 
formal proof. Likewise, it is not hard to define similarity measures and apply them formally. But 
when dealing with complex, real-world objects and events, it is extremely difficult to determine 
what makes two distinct entities equivalent or similar. Equivalence r duces to the claim that two 
referents are treated alike or comparably on a variety of dimensions alient to some particular 
goal or point of view. Thus two events, situations, or objects may be hedgingly described as 
"essentially the same" or may be accepted as equivalent given the goal of the process or inference 
involved. When variance is more marked than appeals to equivalence will tolerate, but parallels 
remain important and it is useful to exploit them, appeals to similarity emerge. It should not be 
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surprising that formal properties of either of these relations as used in real, conceptual structures 
should prove highly complex and elusive. 
Formal treatments tend to view similarity as transitive, symmetric, and sometimes reflexive. 
In conceptual terms, however, the properties break down almost immediately. The most obvious 
failure occurs with reflexivity because of an almost Gricean predilection ot to claim a weaker 
relation when a stronger one holds: a claim of similarity is often taken to deny a claim of identity, 
since were the stronger true, it would normally be said directly. Thus it is odd to say, for instance, 
that dogs are like dogs. 
Formally, for non-empty relations, transitivity and symmetry preclude antireflexivity. A rela- 
tion R is antireflexive provided that Vx-,(zRx). Let R be non-empty, transitive and symmetric. 
Say xRy. Then by symmetry Rx. Now by transitivity xRx. So any x that is related to at least 
one thing by R is related to itself. Since R is non-empty, there must be at least one such x, and 
so it cannot be the case that Vx-',(xRx). 
If similarity is antirefiexive, then either our model is incoherent, or one of transitivity and 
symmetry must fail. The first failure lies in transitivity. When we say that one thing is like 
another, the question arises almost immediately of the ways in which the two do and do not 
correspond. Two things may both be like a third, but like it in very different ways. Tversky [32] 
points out that one can say that Jamaica is similar to Cuba (based on geography) and that 
Cuba is similar to China (because of political orientation), but one cannot thereby conclude that 
Jamaica is similar to China. Similarity has a hidden parameter, or set of parameters, which 
specify the dimensions along which tile relata are claimed to be alike. This may be as simple ,as a 
set of properties, or as complex as a context within which the two, although very different from 
one another, may be treated as substitutes. 
Transitivity failures may even occur along cilains in which the context of comparison is the 
same. Consider Wittgenstein's famous argument for cluster concepts [33], which Rosch cites 
a forerunner of her view of prototypes [34]. Wittgenstein opposed the view that the meaning 
of a term consists of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for application of that term. 
Examining classes such as "game" reveals that the only thing they share is that they are all 
called games. What holds the class together is what he calls "family resemblance": one game 
resembles a second in one set of ways, the second resembles a tifird in another, etc. Games at 
the endpoints of such a cilain may have virtually nothing in common. That is, while they are 
connected by paths of similarity links, they are not sinfilar to one another. Similarity, in the 
ordinary conceptual realm, is not transitive. 
Similarity is not just a link; it forms the basis for patterns of reasoning. It is important, 
therefore, to ask whether those patterns arc always symmetric. In reasoning from analogies, the 
source and target domains are not used symmetrically and are affected by the salience of the 
domains. One can say "This bread is like a rock" but it makes no sense to say "A rock is like this 
bread." The asymmetry is not just the difference between premise and conclusion: the points 
attended to in the two seem different. Tversky calls this the "directionality" of similarity [32]. If 
this is the case, then we should consider carefully whether we want to call similarity symmetric. 
Theoretical support. The initial semantic network proposal by Collins and Quillian [35] included 
similarity as a basic link with the same set of inferences upporting it as their superset link, 
but with less certainty. Inference, in turn, involves comparison of two concepts and judgment 
about their similarity or contradiction. Kintsch handled similarity through rules for generating 
analogies and metaphors [36], and Tversky [32] proposed a feature set evaluation procedure for 
similarity that includes the influence of context. Fahlman's NETL system [25] introduced a "like" 
flag that was a weaker form of the "EQ," or virtual copy command. 
Evidence from linguistic sources and psychological studies. Although the Aristotelian genus/ 
differentia model can be thought o[" as similarity based, dictionary definitions rarely appeal to 
similarity directly. In contrast, similarity emerges as a major component in folk definitions. It 
is found in children's definitions [6,10]: Feifel and Lorge [37] identify "Description" as one of the 
most frequently used types of definitions for younger children. In adult definitions, Markowitz [9] 
found that for definitions of naturally occurring classes, such as trees, similarity of physical form 
plays an important role, which supports Rosch's theory of a "basic level" of taxonomy as the 
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highest level at which there is a generalized physical image of objects. Casagrande and Hale 
found the comparison Link [26] to be sixth in overall frequency among their Papago definitions. 
Reigel's tudies of developmental cognitive structures in children [28], which evaluated concept 
importance by successful structure use in a guessing ame, show that children in the first through 
ninth grades use similarity clues of the form "x is like a y" best. Consequently, he proposed a
linguistic/conceptual link called "synonymity/similars." Carey's work on the development of
category competence in children [38] placed similarity at the heart of children's categorization, 
and Rosch's well known work in prototype theory [34,39] has likewise established the importance 
of similarity in conceptual structures. 
Interaction with other relations. Conceptually, the limiting model of similarity can be seen 
in equivalence r lations. Linguistically, similarity and equivalence are components of synonymy. 
Synonymy is a link between words that purport o describe the same referent (equivalence) and 
otherwise correspond in meaning (similarity and/or equivalence). Most other uses of similarity 
and equivalence imply comparison of different referents. 
Similarity often contains an implicit claim of shared parentage, and tile items being evaluated 
are typically on the same level of the taxonomic tree (see e.g., [40]). The taxonomic orrespon- 
dence is most straightforward for naturally occurring entities like birds and trees but can be 
extended to manufactured objects at or below Rosch's basic level of taxonomy. Similarity for 
manufactured objects can also be based on a function taxonomy, and similarity in events may 
involve comparison of queuing. 
[nfereTtcing. Similarity is an important part of determining category membership, equivalence, 
and difference. Similarity has a more direct and obvious relationship with process and discovery 
procedures than do queuing and part-whole. As a result, it exemplifics our concern with the 
proper and complete characterization f the links or paths of a semantic net. 
In their early semantic network Collins and Quillian [35] treated inference as a comparison 
of two concepts with judgment about their similarity or contradiction. The human processes of 
evaluation and learning have some of the same components. In her work on conceptual devel- 
opment in children Carey [38] placed inductive projection as a central phenomenon of a theory 
of similarity. We believe that, instead, similarity should be viewed as a central component of a 
theory of inductive projection. 
Part-whole 
The part-whole relation is much more familiar than queuing and similarity; it already appears 
in many semantic network models as a single link. We claim that it is necessary to go beyond this 
simplistic onception of part-whole and view it as a family of at least four distinct relations. Be- 
cause these four relations have different logical properties, emantic network models that provide 
only one part-whole link will necessarily make errors in reasoning, at least some of the time, either 
by failing to support correct inferences or by warranting illegitimate ones. In other words, any 
semantic network system that uses links to model reasoning processes must abandon the familiar 
part-whole link, and, instead, give each relation in tile part-whole complex its own separate link. 
Extensive discussions of the relations in the part-whole family appear in Iris et al. [15]. Hence 
for part-whole, most of the material we have been discussing under methodology has already 
been published, and we will not repeat it here. Instead we now consider the controversies over 
its logical properties which led to tile discovery of its multiple nature. 
Serious tudy of the concept of "part" in modern philosophy began with the work of the Polish 
philosopher Lesni~wski, who coined the term Mereology (from the Greek word for part, "Meros') 
to describe this subject. Tarski [41] developed a symbolic alculus for both part and time based 
on the work of Lesni~wski and the philosopher-biologist J.H. Woodger [42]. More recently, the 
American philosopher Richard Martin [43] has reformulated this theory as part of his calculus of 
events. All these philosophers take as axiomatic the transitivity of the part.whole relation, along 
with its reflexivity and symmetry. 
One of the first attempts at inference in artificial intelligence, Raphael's SIR (Semantic Infor- 
mation Retrieval) program [44], used the transitivity of the part-whole relation to deduce that 
since people have hands (as parts) and hands have fingers (as parts), people must have fingers 
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(as parts). Fahlman's NETL program [25] also treated the transitivity of the part-whole relation 
as axiomatic and used it to make arguments about geographical parts of the United States. 
The strongest arguments against the transitivity of the part-whole relation have come from 
linguists. Lyons [40] is responsible for the most notorious counterexample to the transitivity of 
the part-whole relation: "The door has a handle; the house has a door; the house has a handle" 
[Vol I, p. 312]. Cruse [45] responded to Lyons's work with an argument hat part-whole may be 
transitive or not depending on the context. Lyons seems to be the first to suggest resolving this 
conflict by recognizing a multiplicity of part-whole relations. 
Iris et al. [15] take the many names for the part-whole relation and the peculiar instability of 
transitivity as evidence that the part-whole relation is not a single relation but a whole family of 
relations. They postulate four different kinds of parts: functional components (such as a bicycle 
wheel), members of sets, subsets of sets, and pieces cut from otherwise undifferentiated wholes 
(such as a slice of pie). They provide evidence for these models from both folk and dictionary 
definitions. 
We agree with Iris et al. that part-whole is not a single relation but a complex of relations and 
we would argue that any system trying to do common-sense inference needs at least four separate 
relations: funeomp (or functional component), member-set, subset-set (or is-a), and slice. None 
of these is symmetric; none is one-to-one. All but member-set are reflexive, ls-a and slice are 
transitive; funcomp and member-set are not. 
The relation that Raphael calls part-whole [44] is our functio,,al component relation. The 
functional component relation interacts with the is-a relation and the member-set relation in 
common sense reasoning in a highly significant manner. If we know that elephants are mammals 
and mammals have hair then we know that elephants have hair, or more formally, 
W:, y, z[(x ls-A y A :. Funcomp y) - -  z Funcomp x]. 
Ral)hael [44] uses this kind of argument o show that since a boy is a person, and we know 
that people have ten fingers, we can conclude that boys also have ten fingers. What is more, 
since John is a boy, we can assume that John has ten fingers. Thus tile member-set relation 
interacts with the part-whole relation as well. In cognitive science terms, parts are just one kind 
of characteristic that may be inherited, but a very important kind. 
Fablman's part relation [25] is applied to geographical parts of the slice variety, llere his 
transitivity arguments are entirely appropriate. Since Reno is a part of Nevada and Nevada 
is part of the Western Usa, we can use transitivity to infer that Reno is part of the Western 
Usa. Similarly, "If coyotes exist within NEVADA, they also exist within the larger areas, like 
WESTERN-USA, of which NEVADA is a part . . .  " [25, p. 114]. 
Chaftin and Herrmann [46] claim psychological evidence for seven kinds of part-whole relations; 
as well as those postulated by Iris et al. [15], they include stuff (as in skis are made of wood), 
events, and named times in their analysis. We believe that Chaffin and Herrmann's events 
are functional components of the plans or occasions that they are "part" of. Their stuff relation 
belongs to a different relation family, we think, that expresses provenience and substance. Named 
times, like their Valentine's Day example, are better described by the queuing relation (see above). 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper is a product of our concerns about the adequacy ofcurrent semantic networks to 
model human memory and human reasoning processes. '~Ve maintain that semantic networks 
need many more links to represent general conceptual information properly. Semantic network 
systems hould include a wide range of links that are basic to conceptual information processing 
in people and make use of the logical properties of those links in modeling human reasoning. 
In this paper we have described two links, queuing and similarity, that are particularly salient 
in human language and reasoning but that are omitted from most semantic network models. 
Furthermore, we have argued that the relation commonly called part.of or part.whole is really a 
family of relations with distinct logical properties, and that as a consequence, part-whole should 
be replaced in existing networks by the functional component, slice, subset, and member-set 
relations. 
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In describing these relations, we have presented a methodology for identifying, evaluating, 
and describing further links, along with their logical properties. This methodology begins with 
a study of dictionary and folk definitions to obtain the linguistic formulae used to express the 
link in question. The next step is to discover how this link appears in anthropology, linguistics, 
philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. Then we investigate its logical properties, the way 
it interacts with other links, and the way it is used in common sense reasoning. Thus we provide 
evidence for the following three claims: 
* Effective semantic network representations require more links than most current network 
systems employ. 
• For optimal conceptual and representational economy, the links in such representations 
should correspond to conceptually real relationships in humans, as established by research 
from a variety of fields. 
• The logical properties of conceptually realistic links tend to be messy. Nevertheless, it is 
important to investigate and understand those properties o that they can be incorporated 
into our representations. 
We therefore propose that a major goal of research on semantic networks be the identification, 
description, and validation of the set of links that are b~ic to human knowledge representation 
and reasoning. 
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Partial Outline of the Lexical Relations Hierarchy 
FUNDAMENTALLY  SEMANTIC  
RELATIONS 































SgMANTIC ~l AR.K ER$ 










Selects for human 
Selects for ms/e/female 
Selects for animate/inanlmate 
Selects for abstract/concrete 
Physical properties and relations 
General description 
Characteristic sound 
Relative spatial ocation 
GENERIC TYPICAL CASE FRAME FILLERS 
Act-Slot Relations 














Situation /sub j] + verb 
Verb + situation /oh j] 
Miscellaneous 




An-purpose case frvzne 






Paradigmatic verb relations 
State/verb expressing state 
State/verb to achieve state 
State/copular verb used with state 
Object/verb to make ready 
Object/verb to destroy or remove 
Object/verb to deteriorate 
Dispositional relations 
Generic dispositional 
Act/Disposition to act 
Act/Disposition to be acted on 
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FUNDAMENTALLY  MORPHOLOGICAL  
AND SYNTACTIC  RELATIONS 
~[ORPHOLOG ICAL RELATIONS 
State/verb (nominalized verb/verb) 
Noun/related adjective 

















PROPOSIT IONAL ATT ITUDE 
RELATIONS 
F'active 
Implicative 
Only-if 
If 
Negative-if 
Negative-lmpllcative 
Counter- factive 
Dull 
TRULY MISCELLANEOUS 
RELATIONS 
Ownerslxip 
Circulaxhy 
Contingency 
